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wues
the care that a person
and
iLH<CH1LU5

at all places where there is reasonable
persons or
therefrom.
[3] Id.-Injuries-Inspection.-Persons control]
electric power
lines have
of reasonable
inspection of wires
and appliances and should
therein.
!d.-Injuries-Degree of Care.-Where cement company could
have had an electric
its
deenergized,
and could have
for night work
and proper
the care
of it must be measured
by hazard inherent in
wires
with duty
it owed to contractor's
who were injured when contractor's crane came into contact with such wires while
engaged in
work on
rock crusher at
night, and who were as to company, insofar as it had control of
premises, invitees or business visitors rather than licensees or
trespassers.

[1] Liability for
from electric
notes 14 A.L.R.
1023; 56 A.L.R. 1021. See also Cal.Jur.2d, E!ectrie Companies,
§ 15 et seq.; Am.Jur., Electricity, § 74 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Eleetricity, § 17; [2] Electricity,
§ 21(2); [3] Electricity, § 16; [5] Independent Contractors, § 22;
[6] Negligence, §57; [7] Negligenee, § 74; [8, 11] Electricity,
§29; [9] Negligence, §19; [10] Negligence, §16; [12] Negligence,
§ 44(3); [13] Negligence, § 150; [14, 16] Negligence, §§ 32, 33;
§ 33; [18] Electricity,§ 35;
[15] Negligence,§ 32; [17]
[19] Electricity,§ 33(4); [20, 21] Negligence,§ 176; [22] Electricity; § 33(2).
44 C.2d-8
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Ar::mx
Independent

trol of any
to others, for whose
reasonable care, which
eontrol with
[6] Negligence-Care
owner of
of

[8] Electricity-Injuries-Evidence.-In action
ployees
cement company for
eon tractor's crane came into eoutn ct -with
company's
eon1pany \YHS
of injuries is sustained
conclude that,
as company
that contractor's
cranes operated in vicinity of power
unless power was
cut off a danger existed; that work called for
and lighting was such that wires were not visible; that company should han'
that boom of crmw
in contact with wires
to
to place where
would
adequate basis for
would
discover condition or realize
involved.
[9] Negligence-Proximate Cause- Concurrent Causes.-Defendant's negligence need not be sole cause of
1s
if it is
factor which i~
of
[10] Id.- Proximate Cause- Intervening Causes.--If reali:cable
likelihood that third person may act
hazard or one of hazards which makes
such
act whether
criminal doPs not pn•n•nt actor
caused
[11] Electricity-Injuries-Evidence.-In action
eontrartor's
employees
sustained when

[7]

§53 et seq.; Am.Jur.,

§ 97.

[9] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 9
§ 63 et seq.

seq.; Am.Jur.,
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of

is

!d.-Assumption of Risk: Contributory Negligence.-Defenses
of

and

due care.
!d.-Assumption

of risk is
of risk

available when there has been
and such

action by contracccmcnt company for injuries sustaiw'd
crane cnrne into contact with high voltage
an oflen•d instruction
that
would
exercise of ordinary care they should
risk rather than that they

at Hight, erroof risk was
in p1·c
\\'h<·n· eourt did not
doctri nc of
of risk
gaye the jury the elements of the
'"'~mnptwn

and other

stances.
of Law and Fact--Contributory Negconstitutes
consideration to
disturbance or peril
of memory; to
of ordinary care.
[21]
of Law and
Where person must v.rork in
of uoi>MlJle
of care which he is bound to exercise
may
be less by reason of
of
attention to his work
than would otherwise be case; whether or not he was guilty
of contributory
on all facts disclosed by evidence
is jury question, and rule is not different whether danger is
stationary or
[22] Electricity- Instructions.-In action
contractor's employees
cement company for
sustained
when contractor's crane came into contact
voltage
wires on company's
at night, it is
to instruct
jury that it was
to use
nish plaintiffs with
to work and to warn them
which it knew or in exercise of
and that if company knew or
care should have known that work of
company was
prevent occurrence of injuries
connection with such work
wires.

APPEAL
Bernardino
Actions for damages for
plaintiffs affirmed.

re<ct>il>wot

Court of San
Affirmed.
Judgments for

Curtis,
Knauf for Respondents.

burns vvhen a crane came in
were caused
contact with an overhead conduit of
Defendant
from the
diets. It asserts that the evidence vvas insufficient to establish
any
on its
that any claimed negligence on
of the injuries; that
its part was not the
plaintiffs were
as a matter of law;
and error vvas committed in the
of instructions to the
jury.
Defendant owns and operates a plant for the manufacture
of cement on a plot of about 6 acres of ground. A contract
was made between it and Haddock Company to perform, as
extensive alteration and construeand
and Haddock was enm
work for defendant on one of defendant's rock crushers at the time of the accident on ,January
10, 1947. Plaintiffs were Haddock's employees. The job was
a "rush" job and it was known by defendant that the work
as well as
work. At all times dewould
fendant continued the operation of its plant night and day.
It retained control of its premises and plant, although not
of Haddock's employees, equipment and operations, and had
a man on the job (lVIr. Brophy, at the time here pertinent)
whose duties were to observe Haddock's work and to represent
defendant in connection therewith. Haddock was to interfere as little as possible in its work with the operation by defendant of its plant. Defendant through its supervisory
employees knew that Haddock frequently used cranes with
60-foot booms* in its work; that the cranes worked in various
*A crane as referred to consists of a mobile truck or tractor on
which is mounted a boom and the machinery necessary to raise and

defendant's
crusher to be ~mhn'""'rl
the road, and about
from the
owned and maintained an uninsulated three-wire power line
carrying 33,000 volts for usc
defendant in its
The wires were 43.8 feet above the
the line >vas owned by
and the request would be
shut
off-the line
In fact the
granted on previous occasions. Haddock had no
would stop
have the lines deenergized. Such
the operation of defendant's
cause no damage thereto other than the loss of
the shutdown and the
and
is a simple
a switch. The crusher repair
process of opening and
job would take several hours. There also was no obstacle
to the posting of
defendant.
poles supporting the 1vires had notices of
presumably
placed there by California.) In addition to the general
knowledge of defendant of the
cranes operating
near p01ver lines, it had
that the deenergization of those lines, when cranes were
near
the power lines, was a proper
precaution. Prior to
the repair job on the crusher in
and in connection
therewith, Haddock's
Martin requested defendant's superintendent
that the power be shut off
so it would be safe to move a crane about and Brophy refused
the shutdown of defendant's plant.
because it would
(There is considerable conflict on this issue but the
is reasonably susceptible of the
) It could be
inferred that defendant knew the same
would
be needed for the safety of Haddock's men
ary lOth repair of the crusher but should not
dock to make the request in view of the recent refusal.
lower it and its cables. The operator of the boom performed his work
in a cab on the truck or tractor and the driver of the truck or
tractor performed his function from a cab on the truck or tractor.

of

a structure in which rock
mauler attached to the
that the
made
and
Haddock's emof the crusher
5:30 and 6 o'clock.

the power line was not visible;
to ·work on the crane. To fit
of three cables on
of which was the lifting hook.
in rigging. The boom was parallel
five or six feet above the ground.
had been done and plaintiffs went to
the headache ball, a weight to be athook to keep the cables taut and in
to the end of the cable and
the boom had been raised to about
4:-i
and
the truck had been moved toward the
po·wer line to shorten the distance the ball would have to be
carried. The hook was several feet above the ground. Plaintiffs ·were
the ball together and Austin grasped the
hook to attach the b~Jll. The hook was charged with elecof the boom to the power
the hook, the electricity flowed
line.
and Boehm resulting in the injuries
were awarded.
'fl1is court
stated the rule with reference to
owed by one who has control of electricity. " 'On
the standard of care is, that one mainelectricity is required to exercise
the
person of ordinary prudence would exercise
nnder the
the circumstances are the
character of electricity and the inhe rent
to persons or property if it escapes.
nsed must be commensurate with and pro-

to that
application of that ;:,cauu.:u
electricity must be
those
maintaining
probability of
[Citations.]
instrumentality and force
""''w••au'" and
inspection of the
to be
therein.
probability of
safe by proper
& Tel. Co., 157 Cal.
vigilant
and
Elee. Co., 43 Cal.2d
It is
true that California rather than defendant was maintaining
the power line, yet defendant had control
the extent that
it could have the line
and
it controlled its
premises it could provide
and proper warnings. Hence
care
be measured by the hazard inherent in highly charged wires
together with the
it owed to Haddock's employees
(plaintiffs) who were as to
insofar as it had
control of the premises, invitees or business visitors rather
than licensees or
; that their status was invitees is
clear. (Delk v.
118
529 [258
P.2d 75]; Larnar v. John & Wade, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 806
[161 P.2d 970]; Bazzoli v. Nance's
Inc., 109 Cal.
App.2d 232 [240 P.2d 672];
v. A. F. Mattock Co.,
15 Cal.2d 622 [104 P.2d
; La j}falfa v. Piornbo Bros., 70
Cal.App.2d 840 [161 P.2d 964]; Prosser on Torts, p. 636.)
[5] "One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any
of the work,
is subject to liability for
harm to others, for whose
safety the employer owes a
to exercise reasonable care,
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with
reasonable care . . . . The employer may, however, retain a
control less than that which is necessary to subject him to
liability as master. He may retain
the power to direct
the order in which the work shall be done or to forbid its
being done in a manner
to be
to himself or
others. Such a supervisory control may not subject him to
liability under the
of
but he may be
liable under the rule stated in this Section unless he exercises
his supervisory control with reasonable care so as to prevent the
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avoid
P.2d

was the
cause of
could conclude that, knowing
that Haddock's cranes operated in the
of the power
unless the power was cut off a
existed; that work called for night operation and
the lighting was such that the wires were not visible; that
it should have
that the boom of the crane might
wires
the electricity to
where it would cause injury; that
there was not
basis for believing that Haddock's
employees would discover the condition or realize the danger
involved because the wires were not visible and the employees
might
assume that they were not charged or they
might
have
their presence due to the
rush
and nature of the work.
Defendant refers to the
of Martin, Haddock's
superintendent, that he knew of the presence of the wires
when the work on the crusher was being done and that
of plaintiffs that
knew of the wires. Martin's testimony
was contradictory and could have been disbelieved by the
jury. The jury could have concluded that while plaintiffs
the nature of the
knew
of the
of the
job and
were such that the danger was
not so obvious to
that defendant would be relieved
of liability.
Stress is also laid upon the duty under the statutes and
regulations and that it was Haddock's nondelegable duty

such an act whether
tortious or criminal does
liable for harm eaused
It has been held that the
Hestatement of Torts, sections
in this state. (Slasulat v. Pacific
Cai.2ll 631 [67 P.2d
. ) " (111 osley v.
2G Cal.2c1
219 [157 P.2d 372, 158
relic~d upon by defendant are disiu
v. Paranwunt Pro287 [91 P.2d 231], among other
diff'el'Clicces there 1ras no knowledge by defendant of the use
the work in progress. 'l'he \York \vas not a
;mel was done in the daylight.
(! i:,enc:siull is also 11ertinent to the
q twstion
On the basis of the
<Jbono ;heussed e\iclenee the jury was justified in finding
iuti ffs were fn•e from contributory negligence. ·while
haYe obserYed the wires on defendant's premof
have momentheir presence under the circumstances.
mar be in aeeorcl with the conman. (See Bickham v. Sonthern
Cal.App.2cl 815 [263 P.2d 32] ;
L. & P. Corp., 21 Cal.App.2d 376
Oas <f' E1u:. Co., 4;3 Cal.2d
and eases citecl
;.;hon!1l lw emphasized tllat the qnescause and contributory neglicireumsiancrs snch as we have here are to be
determined
the trier of fact. (Nev'is v. Pacific Gas &
F!1c. Co., supra, 43 Cal.2cl 62G.)

Defendant asserts
matter of law.

a

plaintiffs did not assume the risk.
tion of risk was recently stated
of assumption of risk and
on different theories.
a lack of due care.
the other hand, will
that plaintiff may have acte(1 with due
of
is available when there has been a
a risk and such acceptance, whether express or
has
been made with knowledge and
of the risk
[16] ·where the fads are such that the
must have
had knowledge of the hazard, the situation is
to
actual knowledge, and there may be an
of the
risk, but \Yhere it merely appears that he should or could
have discovered the danger by the exercise of
of
the defense is contributory negligence and not
risk." (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery
42 Cal.2d 158, 161-162
[265 P.2d 904].) [17] Defendant's offered
instructions on the defense of assumption of risk were refused but
the basic one was erroneous under the Prescott case in that
it advised the jury that plaintiffs would have assumed the
risk if in the exercise of ordinary care
should have
known of and appreciated the risk rather than that they
must have had knowledge of the danger. The other instructions were connected with the basie one and would have been
confusing if the basic one were not given. Such instructions
are erroneous and the trial court was under no
to revise
them to state the law accurately.
Oo., supra, 42 Cal.2d 158; Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38
Cal.2d 375 [240 P.2d 580) ; 'l'ossman v.
37 Cal.2d
522 [233 P.2d 1] .)
[18] 'fhe court, howeYer, on its initiative gave an instruction that it was not instructing on "the doctrine of assumption
of risk because that doctrine is not
in this case.
However, the court is instructing you on the doctrine of contributory negligence" and the instructions on that issue
will govern your deliberations on the issne of
negligence. The evidence would have
instruction
on assumption of risk; however, we believe
wl1ile assumption of risk and contributory negligence are distinguishable

a matter
Bnt to
or to be in a state of abstraction or absent-mindedness or to
err in
may or may not
on
whether or not in the circumstances it shows a want of
ordinary care. Also the
must consider the character
of the notice
whether recent
remote and the
impression such information would make upon the mind of
an
like situation.'' (Emphainstruction with
to
''
not
it
created
misconduct nor is he
care." And: " . . . a
of his faculties of
the lawful
of
one
instruc"If
not
negligent.
bar recovery unless such

Defendant's main contention is that the instruction is not
correct statement of the law in that '-'"V"'""c'u
indicate lack of
unless
confronted with a sudden and
It should

on contributory negstated in many cases.
As expressed
recent ones, whether
of a
is a quesconsideration to the circumno sudden disturbance or peril
the lapse of memory; to
unless it shows a want of ordinary
the
is one for the
(Hayes v.
s1.tpra, 38 Cal.2d
385; Kirk v. Los
26 Cal.2d
840 [161 P.2d 673, 164
Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647, 656 [122
P.2d 576]; Gibson v. County
Mendocino, 16 Cal.2d 80, 89
[105 P.2d
; Hall v. Barber Door Co .., 218 Cal. 412, 420
[23 P.2d
1lleindersee v.
188 Cal.
503-504
[205 P. 1078] ; Giraudi :v. Electric
Co., 107 Cal. 120, 125
[40 P.
48
28 L.R.A. 596]; Smith v.
Southern Pac. Co., 201 Cal. 57 [255 P. 500] ; Roseberry v.
Edward F. Niehaus & Co., 166 Cal. 481, 483 [137 P. 232] ;
Jacobson v. Oakland Jl!Ieat etc. Co., 161 Cal.
430 [119 P.
653, Ann.Cas. 1913B 1194]; Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal.2d 418,
; see cases collected 19 Cal.Jur. 587-593,
425 [170 P.2d

Co. [44 C.2d
)

Such cases
162 CaL 327

mentioning the circumstances
'\vas well summarized in Lindre v.
351 [190 P.2d 47], quoting from
174 [263 P. 255]: "'The rule
of la\Y contended for is as foilows: Momentary forgetfulness
of a known
not induced by a sudden and adequate disnegligence, qualifying this by
is not negligence unless it shows a
\rant of
care. 'l'he qualification is not absolute but
npon the facts of the particular case. There is a long
line of cases
that forgetfulness is as a matter of law
that \Yill defeat recovery
cases.] It is upon
that
bases her claim of contributory
However, as is said in
Jacobson v. Oakland Meat [&Packing] Co., 161 CaL [425] 430
P.
Ann.Cas. 1913B 1194], one element in all these
\Yith the danger he forgot.
standanl of negligence per se the
rule that if one may be charged with a knowledge, past or
of a
, he is precluded from recovery for insustained therefrom and let the rule rest there for all
("ases -would be to establish a doctrine dangerous in its applicatimJ and unsound in principle and one not warranted by the
prrsent
of
Courts are nnwilling to declare
tlwt
kno'xn danger ahvays amounts to negligence
v. Oakland JJJ~eat [& Packing] Co., supra, [161
'l'he true rule to be deduced from the cases cited
is tl1nt the
shown must be under circumstances
sufflr:ient to enable a court to determine that such lack of
memory constituted
per se . .. .' "

;\pr.J!J,):J] AL'STIX

1'.

HrnmsmE
[44 C.2d 225;

PoR'!'L:\::-.:n
69]

Defendant aHaeks tlw

unusual

necessities of such a
m so
caution that he may talw for his own
of caution required of him
care." It contends that here
did not require them to work on the erane
imity to the wires and the wires 1ver·c not
they were stationary and 43 feet aboYe
seen, there is evidence tl1at the work \\·as (lone
manner and place and plaintifrs \\'Pre
It is urged that the rule aunolmcerl in
applies to persons ·whose ·work must be
streets where there are
zani Motors, Lid., 109 Cal
[21] It has long been recognized that ".
where a pN'son
must work in a position of possible
the amount of care
which he is bound to ('xereise for his O\•:n
be less by reason of the
of his
work than would othenvise be the case.
Portland Cement Go., 162 Cal.
40 [120 P.
American Smelling etc.
3+ CaL\pp.2c1
P.2d 841]; Mecham v. Crump, 1:37
Ji30 P.2d 568] ; Woods Y.
1;3:)
[ 24 P.2d 8631; Jones v. Ilcdgcs, 12:3 Cal
P.2d 111]; Driscoll v.
St. B. R.
208, 215 et seq. [250 P. ]062] .) Wlwther or not
zlent
was guilty of eontributory
rlosed by the eYic1enc(; \Ya'' a jm',l'
y
B('thlehem etc. Gorp., ();) Cal
7!J5. 801
fi-17].)
\Ve see no rrason why the rule should be (1iffercnt \Yhether the
danger is stationary or
'l'he
of whether
plaintiffs were acting as pc·rsons of
the circumstances \Yas left to i he
am1
others on the same
[22] The following jnry im:;tructions are
Instruction No. 64: "It was the duty of the defendant cement

to

are affirmed.

No. 5!343.

In Bank.

6,

In re W ..'l.RREN E. BARTGES, on Habeas
Evidence--Judicial Notice-Laws of Sister States.-In
of
of Code Civ. Proc., §
subd.
crime
notice be taken of statutory definition
it is mistake for appellate court to state that, there
evidence to contrary, it will be assumed that law
to crimes charged as prior convictions in sister
as it is in California.
[2] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Excess of Jurisdiction.Petitioner's contention on habeas corpus that
him in consolidated criminal cases were incorrect
power of superior court to make
District Court of
to affirm) in determining that two of three
(the charges of which had been
of
for habeas
moot where, after
District Ceurt of Appeal recalled its remittitur and modified
trial court's judgments so as to recite
one
conviction, and sheriff then filed
return which shows
that petitioner is held under modified abstraet of
which show only one prior
since he has
relief in that
to which he was entitled.
[3] Criminal Law-Habitual Offenders-Review.-Where
ant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms on two
counts of which he was found guilty, but
found that defendant suffered three
the charges of two of which had been dismissed
supported by proof, it cannot be said on habeas
trial court's unwarranted determination as to numhrr of
convictions did not influence it
to
[1] See Cal.Jnr.2d, Evidence, § 27;
McK. Dig. References: [1] Evidence, § 37;
§ 9; [3] Criminal Law, § 1459; [4] Criminal
[ 5] Habeas Corpus, § 2; [ !3, 7] Habeas

§ 65.

